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Federal Asbestos Legislation: And the Winners Are…
 
After years of debate, Congress has begun what could be final consideration of legislation to 
provide compensation to victims of asbestos exposure. The stakes of the bill are enormous: It 
promises to provide an estimated $140 billion over 30 years, and hundreds of thousands of 
American workers or their families, who have suffered serious injury or death, will be depending 
on the fund. 
 
The bill, S. 852, sponsored by Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) with noteworthy support from Sen. 
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), would create a privately funded, publicly run trust fund. But as is 
common in Washington special interest politics, powerful moneyed interests have strongly 
influenced the legislative process. Under the guise of providing aid to victims, these interests 
have successfully written down their liability by tens of billions of dollars – thus sharply 
reducing the funds that will be available to victims. 
 
These big winners in the legislation now before the U.S. Senate are an unknown number of 
Fortune 500 companies – including Dow Chemical, Ford, General Electric, General Motors, 
Georgia Pacific, Honeywell, Pfizer and Viacom – and at least 10 asbestos makers that have filed 
for bankruptcy. The lobbying campaign on behalf of the Fortune 500 companies has been led by 
a relatively obscure entity called the Asbestos Study Group (ASG), which was established in 
2001. ASG does not make its membership list public. [See Appendix A for ASG member 
companies and their allies.] 
 
At the same time, some of the nation’s largest and savviest investment firms have positioned 
themselves to score big rewards should the legislation pass.  
 
This report details the behind-the-scenes action, with its huge lobbying campaign, aimed at 
ensuring passage of one of the most significant bills in Congress – legislation that promises to 
help victims but ends up being more of a special interest bailout. 
 
Major findings of this report include: 
 
• The total contributions on behalf of asbestos victims paid by 10 large asbestos firms, were 
they to complete their bankruptcy proceedings under current law, would drop from an 
estimated $25.9 billion to $5.6 billion if S. 852 becomes law. This represents a savings of 
$20.3 billion, or 78.5 percent, expressed in today’s dollars. On an individual basis, asbestos 
companies would effectively see their total payments over the life of the fund decline by 
margins ranging from 40.5 percent to 100 percent. 
 
• At least eight Fortune 500 companies are huge winners under S. 852, because their annual 
asbestos payments to the trust fund would be capped at $27.5 million per year for 30 years, 
no matter how large their revenues or how many asbestos cases they might have pending 
against them. In current dollars, this means their maximum liability is $378.5 million. By 
comparison, Dow Chemical projects its future liability at between $1.6 billion and $2.2 
billion from 2004 to 2019. Similarly, Honeywell estimates its future liability payments at 
 
Public Citizen’s Congress Watch 4 “Federal Asbestos Legislation: And the Winners Are…” 
 
$2.75 billion from 2004 through 2018. But the company would pay only 13.8 percent of that 
amount – $378.5 million – over the next 30 years. 
 
• Goldman Sachs, a leading Wall Street investment banking firm, has been providing critical 
advice to the Asbestos Study Group (ASG) and the Senate Judiciary Committee since at least 
2003 regarding two crucial matters: The feasibility of financing the proposed trust fund to 
compensate victims, and at what level it should be funded. The firm’s role appears to be 
highly unusual – if not inappropriate – because the investment company has a big stake in the 
legislation’s outcome via significant holdings in Fortune 500 firms that stand to see their 
stock prices appreciate considerably under S. 852. As that happens, Goldman Sachs, through 
its holdings in those companies, will benefit as well. 
 
• To get the best bill possible, the Fortune 500 companies created the ASG, a relatively 
unknown coalition that doled out at least $23.1 million to lobby Congress in 2003 and 2004. 
(ASG spent $24.4 million on lobbying since 2001, when it was created.) Such sums from one 
group focused exclusively on one issue are virtually unprecedented. ASG alone employed 40 
lobbyists during those two years. 
 
• More than 90 percent of ASG’s lobbying funds went to the D.C.-based firm of Swidler 
Berlin Sherref & Friedman and its lobbying arm, the Harbour Group. The Harbour Group is a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Swidler Berlin and was created in 2001 as an explicitly 
Democratic lobbying firm based around several high-level staffers who were leaving the 
White House at the end of President Clinton’s second term. 
 
• Public Citizen estimates that the ASG, six so-called “Tier 1” bankrupt asbestos companies 
and seven “Tier 2” Fortune 500 companies spent a combined $144.5 million lobbying 
Congress from 2003 through 2004, the latest figures available. The amount spent by ASG 
and the Tier 1 companies – $27.9 million – was probably almost exclusively to pass asbestos 
bailout legislation. The $86.6 million spent by the seven Fortune 500 companies was for 
asbestos legislation and other matters, but lobby disclosure forms do not provide a 
breakdown of each issue or bill category. But the sum spent on asbestos work for some of the 
Fortune 500 companies had to be considerable given the number of lobbyists they employed 
who described working on this issue.  
 
• ASG and the 13 companies employed 168 individual lobbyists during 2003 and 2004 to work 
on asbestos legislation. Pfizer alone reported employing 45 lobbyists, Dow Chemical had 20, 
Honeywell had 19, General Motors had 18, and General Electric reported 13. Of those, 
Public Citizen counts 94 – or 57.7 percent – who walked through the “revolving door” from 
government service to the private sector, including seven former members of Congress. 
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Asbestos Companies Will Save at Least $20.3 Billion 
Through Reduced Liability Payments 
 
Under S. 852, asbestos companies with large existing liabilities that are in Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
– known as Tier 1 companies – would have those liabilities erased, in favor of contributions to 
the proposed asbestos trust fund. But the value of contributions to the trust fund would be 
substantially less than the existing liabilities, providing significant windfalls to the companies 
involved.  
 
For example, the total contributions to asbestos victims that would be paid by 10 large asbestos 
firms were they to complete their bankruptcy proceedings under current law will drop from an 
estimated $25.9 billion to $5.6 billion should S. 852 become law – that’s a savings of $20.3 
billion, or 78.5 percent expressed in today’s dollars. [See Figure 1] The amount drops so 
significantly because the formula the legislation uses to establish contributions from this group – 
an amount based on 1.67 percent of 2002 revenue1 – is designed to yield a smaller amount than 
this collection of firms would otherwise owe without the legislation. That, in turn, means the 
overall amount of money available for victim compensation will be significantly less. 
 
On an individual basis, bankrupt asbestos companies would effectively see their total payments 
over the life of the fund on behalf of asbestos victims decline by margins ranging from 40.5 
percent to 100 percent.  
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Figure 1 
Comparison of Total Liability Payments for Tier 1 Asbestos Companies 
In Bankruptcy – Current Law vs. S. 852 
 
Company 
Est. Current Total 
Asbestos Liability 
(Current Dollars in 
Millions) 
Est. Total Value 
of Contributions 
Under S. 852 
(Current Dollars in 
Millions) 
$ 
Savings 
% 
Savings 
Armstrong World 
Industries                       $2,011  $729 $1,282 63.7% 
Babcock & Wilcox                        2,078                              328 1,750 84.2 
Combustion 
Engineering                         1,255 Minimal 1,255 100.0 
G-I Industries/GAF                        1,826                              313 1,513 82.9 
NARCO/Honeywell*                        2,500                                475 2,025 81.0 
Kaiser Aluminum                        1,515                              163 1,352 89.2 
Owens Corning/ 
Fibreboard                        3,871                           2,304 1,567 40.5 
Pittsburgh Corning                         3,599                                46 3,553 98.7 
USG Corp.                        4,070                              797 3,273 80.4 
W.R. Grace & Co.                        3,183                              418 2,765 86.9 
Total                     $25,907                           $5,573 $20,334 78.5% 
Source: L. Tersigni Consulting P.C., which is the U.S. Bankruptcy Court-approved financial adviser to the Official 
Committee of Asbestos Personal Injury Claimants.  
Notes: Totals may differ due to rounding. 
*Honeywell is not in bankruptcy, but it has agreed in principle to fund NARCO’s 524(g) bankruptcy trust, a 
company it previously owned. Its liability would be based on those of other Tier 2 companies under S. 852.  
“Estimated Current Total Asbestos Liability” column is based on estimates of what would be the asbestos 
companies’ contributions to their own respective trusts to compensate victims if the federal fund is not created. 
“Estimated Total Value of Contributions Under S. 852” column represents the present value of contributions over 
30 years using a 6 percent discount rate. 
 
Similarly, under S. 852, annual contributions to the trust fund from 10 bankrupt asbestos 
companies would decline 92.4 percent compared to what they were paying to victims prior to 
declaring bankruptcy. Total annual company payments would drop from a pre-bankruptcy 
level of $3.6 billion to $279 million. [See Figure 2]  
 
For this reason, it has been in the interests of asbestos companies in bankruptcy to delay their 
bankruptcy cases, awaiting the outcome of the federal legislation. For example, in February, 
the Intelligencer Journal newspaper in Lancaster, Pa. reported that creditors in the 
Armstrong World Industries bankruptcy case had been trying to delay resolution of the 
company’s bankruptcy in the hopes the firm would fare better under legislation like S. 852. 
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Eduardo C. Roberno said the history of the case was “tortuous, even 
for a large Chapter 11 proceeding.” The case docket has 7,800 entries, which the judge said 
reflected “the shifting political winds buffeting the parties.”2 
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Figure 2 
Comparison of Total Annual Liability Payments for Tier 1 Asbestos Companies  
in Bankruptcy – Pre-bankruptcy Payments vs. S. 852 
 
Company 
Est. Most Recent 
Annual Payment to 
Claimants by 
Asbestos Companies 
(Current Dollars in 
Millions) 
Est. Annual 
Contribution 
to Proposed 
Asbestos Trust Fund 
(Current Dollars in 
Millions) 
$  
Savings 
%  
Savings 
Armstrong World 
Industries $252                              $53 $199 79.0% 
Babcock & Wilcox 486                                24 462 95.1 
Combustion 
Engineering  328  minimal 328 100.0 
G-I Industries/ GAF 233                                23 210 90.1 
NARCO/Honeywell* N/A                                   3 N/A N/A 
Kaiser Aluminum 114                                12 102 89.5 
Owens Corning/ 
Fibreboard 1,488                                73 1,415 95.1 
Pittsburgh Corning  218                                   3 215 98.6 
USG Corp. 143                                58 85 59.4 
W.R. Grace & Co. 370                                30 340 91.9 
Total $3,632 $279 $3,356 92.4% 
Sources:  
Legal Analysis Systems, from claims databases for each listed debtor, for the “Estimated Most Recent Annual 
Payment to Claimants by Asbestos Companies” column. The data is for the most recent year preceding 
bankruptcy, which varies by company.   
L. Tersigni Consulting P.C., which is the U.S. Bankruptcy Court-approved financial adviser to the Official 
Committee of Asbestos Personal Injury Claimants, for the column “Estimated Annual Contribution to Proposed 
Asbestos Trust Fund.”  
* Honeywell is not in bankruptcy, but it has agreed in principle to fund NARCO’s 524(g) bankruptcy trust, a 
company it previously owned. Its liability would be based on those of other Tier 2 companies under S. 852. 
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Fortune 500 Companies Will See Dramatic 
Reductions in Their Asbestos Liability 
 
Over the last 25 years or so, the bulk of financial liability for workers’ asbestos exposure has 
fallen on Tier 1 companies involved in the manufacture and distribution of asbestos. But 
increasingly, legal action to compensate victims is turning to other large firms whose workers 
were injured on the job due to their employer’s use of asbestos – so-called Tier 2 companies. 
As with asbestos makers, these firms also stand to see their liability substantially reduced 
under the proposed asbestos legislation.  
 
Public Citizen has compiled a list of eight Fortune 500 companies that likely fall into this 
category, although there are probably more. With the exception of Georgia Pacific, these 
companies have been identified in congressional testimony or in their own news releases as 
being part of a coalition known as the Asbestos Study Group (ASG). Little is known about 
ASG, but it appears to have been established in 2001 to solely benefit the Fortune 500 
companies with substantial asbestos liability.  
 
In recent years, these companies and their subsidiaries have accrued billions of dollars in 
liabilities for asbestos-related injuries to their workers, according to company documents and 
news accounts, with billions more expected. [See Figure 3]  
 
The measure of these companies’ savings under S. 852 can be seen in the legislation’s 
proposed formula for determining future payments into the national asbestos trust fund. The 
formula bases these future payments on a company’s previous asbestos liability. Under the 
formula, the maximum a Tier 2 company can be assessed is $27.5 million annually over a 
period of 30 years.3 Expressed in today’s dollars, that stream of payments is worth an 
estimated $378.5 million.4 As amounts in Figure 3 show, that liability is far less than some 
companies have paid in recent years, and it is much lower than companies would otherwise 
expect to pay absent the national trust. 
 
For example, Dow Chemical projects its future liability at between $1.6 billion and $2.2 
billion from 2004 to 2019. But under S. 852 the company’s liability payments will be 
reduced to an estimated $378.5 million over the next 30 years. Similarly, Honeywell 
estimates its future liability payments at $2.75 billion from 2004 through 2018. But the 
company would pay only 13.8 percent of that amount – $378.5 million – over the next 30 
years. 
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Figure 3 
 Tier 2 Fortune 500 Companies 
Estimated Past and Future Liability for Asbestos Cases 
 
Company Past Liability Future Liability Claimants 
Dow Chemical/ 
Union Carbide 
$233 million in 2001, 
$155 million in 2002, 
$293 million in 2003, 
$300 million in 2004. 
Between $1.6 billion 
and $2.2 billion 
through 2019. 
203,416 filed as 
of 12/31/2004. 
General 
Electric 
Between $420 million 
and $560 million through 
2002.  
N/A 55,000 open 
cases as of April 
2002. 
Ford Motor 
Company 
$1.7 billion at the end of 
2000. 
Says it can’t be 
estimated. 
25,000 pending 
claims as of 
February 2003; 
41,500 pending 
claims as of 
February 2004. 
General Motors $10 million in 2001. Says it can’t be 
estimated; has not 
reported asbestos 
costs since 2001. 
 
N/A 
Georgia Pacific N/A In 2001, predicted 
liabilities to be less 
than $1 billion through 
2011, with insurance 
covering all but $350 
million. Estimate of 
liability after insurance 
through 2013 recently 
increased to $550 
million.  
269,700 asbestos 
claims through 
December 2002. 
Honeywell/ 
NARCO/ 
Bendix 
$557 million in 2003, 
$518 million in 2004. 
$2.75 billion through 
2018 for NARCO and 
Bendix.  
N/A 
Pfizer/Quigley $369 million in 2004. No estimate but says 
trust of $430 million 
would resolve future 
liabilities.  
N/A 
Viacom/ 
Westinghouse 
$56.6 million after 
insurance in 2003, $58.4 
million in 2004 after 
insurance. 
N/A  112,140 claims 
pending as of 
Dec. 31, 2004. 
Source: Figures compiled from company filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. General 
Electric data is from Reuters, April 28, 2003. 
Notes: The companies do not use a consistent format in reporting their liabilities; hence exact or uniform 
comparisons are unavailable. Bendix is a Honeywell subsidiary. 
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Documents Show Fortune 500 Companies Long Knew  
Of the Dangers of Asbestos Exposure 
 
In their annual filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, after reciting their 
potential asbestos liability exposure, the Fortune 500 companies quickly pivot and claim they 
are not responsible for the mounting death and injury toll from asbestos.  
 
Public Citizen has examined internal company memos, letters, scientific analyses and 
responses to legal interrogatories for several of these companies. The information provides 
considerable evidence that companies knew, or should have known, of the dangers of 
asbestos exposure long before they acknowledged the risk.  
 
For several of the Fortune 500 companies, the following descriptions summarize evidence of 
their awareness of the deadly effects of asbestos.   
 
Dow Chemical 
Dow has used asbestos in products as well as in its own production facilities. In court 
documents, the company says the hazards of respirable asbestos were not generally 
recognized until the late 1960s. In particular, Dow says, it first learned in the late 1960s that 
asbestos caused irreversible lung disease, including cancer and mesothelioma.5 
 
But internal company documents that have surfaced as part of asbestos lawsuits indicate 
asbestos’ general danger was well known decades earlier, and that there were specific 
indications of excessive asbestos exposure within Dow well before the late 1960s. 
 
• In 1968 – about the time Dow said the hazards of asbestos were being recognized, an 
executive of Dow’s biochemical research laboratory wrote: “Asbestos has long been 
known” to be capable of causing asbestosis.6 
 
• Three decades earlier, a 1938 report by the U.S. Public Health Service, which Dow 
received, described asbestos textile factory workers whose exposure to asbestos fibers led 
to development of asbestosis. Even by the time of its report, the Public Health Service 
said, the dangers of asbestos exposure had been well-documented.7 
 
• A 1951 report by Dow’s biochemical research unit showed atmospheric concentration in 
certain company operations was exceeding, on a temporary basis, maximum allowable 
concentrations of asbestos.8  
 
• In investigating a worker’s illness, the research lab reported in 1958 that the worker, 
employed in the making of vinyl-asbestos tile, had been exposed to “excessive 
concentrations of airborne asbestos.”9 
 
• A 1985 Dow handbook on the handling of asbestos noted that instances of asbestosis had 
been recorded since 1899.10 
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After the dangers of exposure became known, Dow took steps to stem worker exposure, the 
documents show, declaring in 1969, for example, that the company had “a moral and legal 
commitment” to implement the best known health standards as soon as possible.11 Still, some 
exposure problems continued at least until the mid-1980s, the documents show.12 
 
General Motors 
GM began using asbestos in its braking systems in 1939, and there is little doubt that within a 
decade its executives knew about the dangers from asbestos. In addition to breaking systems, 
another significant GM use of asbestos was in automobile clutches.  
 
A review of the documents produced in various civil cases paints a clear portrait of GM’s 
level of knowledge more than 50 years ago.  
 
• In 1939, an internal GM memo indicated there was a particular hazard in the plant where 
GM manufactured brakes and clutch facings.13  
 
• In 1948, a GM industrial hygienist published articles about the dangers of asbestos and 
how to control the hazard.14 Vincent Castrop wrote that the grinding of brake linings can 
cause a dangerous level of asbestos release.  
 
Through the decades, the professional associations and scientific foundations to which many 
GM scientists and medical experts belonged published numerous articles about the dangers 
of asbestos.  
 
GM industrial hygienist Frank Patty served on the Chemical and Toxicological Committee of 
the Industrial Hygiene Foundation (IHF) in 1949.  That was the same year the IHF published 
a summary of the Journal of the American Medical Association editorial “Asbestosis and 
Cancer of the Lung” in its magazine Industrial Hygiene Digest.15  
 
Yet, given clear evidence that GM officials knew of the dangers of asbestos, it wasn’t until 
1979 that the company issued a statement entitled “General Motors Programs on Non-
Asbestos Friction Materials,” in which the company promised to stop using asbestos in its 
brake systems by 1985.16   
 
Not only did GM fail on that promise, but in 1986 during an Environmental Protection 
Agency hearing on phasing out asbestos, it reversed its stand on the whole safety issue of 
asbestos, when GM industrial hygienist William Krebs argued that “asbestos brake lining and 
brake relining operations do not present a risk of adverse health consequences to those 
involved.”17  
 
Ultimately GM and other auto-makers beat back the EPA in 1991 when an order by the 
agency to phase out the use of asbestos in cars was overturned by a court in 1997.18 
 
Though it is still legal to use asbestos in U.S. automobiles, it has been banned in cars since 
1998 in a number of European countries including France, Germany and Italy.19  
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Pfizer/Quigley  
Pfizer reported in 2004 that it had an asbestos liability of $369 million.20  That liability stems 
from products manufactured by its wholly owned subsidiary, the Quigley Company. 
 
In the 1940s, Quigley began manufacturing two insulation products that contained asbestos – 
Insulag and Panelag.  A review of documents obtained during the course of civil litigation 
indicates that Quigley officials knew decades ago about the potential health risk of its 
products.  
 
• The Aetna insurance company conducted an “Occupational Disease Survey” in 1959 
and noted that the company’s Insulag product presented a risk of “asbestosis 
exposure.”21 Yet a 1969 company brochure advertised its Insulag as “NON-
INJURIOUS.”22   
  
• An internal Quigley memo written in 1971 indicated that officials considered finding 
a substitute for asbestos in its Panelag product after a labor union began to complain 
about the health dangers of the product.23  
 
• A 1973 internal company memo discussed options for 69 tons of stored asbestos. 
Quigley was phasing out its asbestos-containing products. The memo recommended 
against using only enough asbestos to manufacture products to cover the company’s 
outstanding orders. Instead, it recommended the entire quantity of asbestos be used to 
manufacture as much product as possible until Quiqley’s asbestos supply was 
depleted. The extra asbestos-containing products could then be stored for later sale.24  
 
Quigley proposed to a bankruptcy court that a trust be established for those claiming injuries 
from its asbestos products. The trust would be funded with a $430 million payment from its 
parent corporation Pfizer, which expects to recover $263 million of that cost from its 
insurance carrier.25  
 
Viacom/Westinghouse 
Viacom says that as of December 31, 2004 it had 112,140 asbestos claims pending as a result 
of actions against its Westinghouse subsidiary.26  
 
Numerous internal Westinghouse documents show the company frequently gave little 
priority to the hazards posed by asbestos in its manufacture of electrical generating 
equipment and other products. They show: 
 
• A Westinghouse industrial hygiene engineer wrote in a memo of January 11, 1946 that 
recent physical examinations of employees at a company plant near Philadelphia 
showed several lung conditions that “might possibly be associated with exposure to 
dust in the department.” The engineer wrote that while the lung problems may or may 
not be connected to their jobs, “a claim for compensation from any of these people 
would be very difficult to defend because of the fact that the protection provided in this 
department at the present time can hardly be called suitable or adequate.”27 
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• A memo written to a safety engineer at one Westinghouse facility in 1961 said, “Our air 
samples show that the maximum allowable concentration of asbestos dust was 
considerably exceeded.”28 
 
• An OSHA citation and notification of penalty was issued to Westinghouse on 
September 26, 1980 for asbestos-related problems.  OSHA labeled the violations as 
“willful” and said the company had not properly documented illnesses arising from 
occupational exposure to asbestos. The federal agency also said the hazards were 
“likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees.”29   
 
• In 1987, a Westinghouse attorney and the manager of the company’s industrial hygiene 
unit conducted an inventory of documents dating back to the early 1930s. Their report 
was disturbing. They called some of the records “smoking gun documents” and 
recommended that many of them be destroyed. Among the comments in the report: 30 
 
o “The fact that the Corporation performed, for example, air sampling for certain 
substances as early as 1940 (which it in fact did) might be used to prove early 
knowledge on the part of the Corporation of hazards associated with such 
substances.” 
 
o “We recommend that all such files generated prior to 1974 should be discarded.  
As stated before, these records are filled with documentation dating back to the 
1930’s which critiques and criticizes Westinghouse operations and points out 
deficiencies in such operations.” 
 
o “These files show corporate knowledge of hazards but no actual implementation 
or corrective measures. Consequently, the documentation is potentially harmful.” 
 
In a 2004 filing with the SEC, Westinghouse’s parent corporation, Viacom, said it could not 
estimate or project the number of people in the future who would file claims against the 
company because of exposure to asbestos.31  
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S. 852 Will Transfer Significant Wealth From Victims to 
Investment Firms and “Vulture” Investors 
 
If S. 852 becomes law, the stock prices of asbestos firms and other companies facing 
significant asbestos liability are expected to benefit significantly. This is because the 
legislation, by virtue of fixing contributions to the proposed national asbestos trust fund, 
would cap the companies’ future liability. This new liability is set by a formula based on past 
asbestos liability. (See previous section.) 
 
If the stock prices rise as expected, the major beneficiaries will be the companies’ major 
investors. Yet at the same time these investors stand to realize significant gains, there is 
concern the asbestos compensation fund may not have enough assets to compensate victims. 
To begin with, the maximum payment available to the sickest victims would be limited to 
$1.1 million. By contrast, in the traditional legal system, juries have often determined that 
victims’ injuries are so severe that they are entitled to multi-million-dollar damage awards. In 
addition, as recent congressional testimony has made clear, there are serious concerns 
whether the federally run fund, as it is currently proposed, will have enough money to 
operate. That’s one reason the fund is to have low-cost government borrowing privileges, 
meaning that if such borrowing is required, taxpayers will be providing a subsidy to the 
companies that have injured their workers. 
 
Taken together, the expected benefits to investors and concerns about payments to victims 
mean that a large transfer of wealth stands to take place – from victims to investors. 
 
Halliburton, one of the earliest and most prominent asbestos companies subject to large 
liabilities, illustrates how company fortunes improve when liability is fixed. In January 2005, 
it resolved its asbestos bankruptcy, establishing its own $4.8 billion trust fund to compensate 
victims.32 Establishment of that fund wiped out future asbestos liability for the company, and 
for that, Wall Street has rewarded the company handsomely. Its stock price has soared from 
under $10 in advance of its December 2003 bankruptcy filing to $42 in recent trading.33  
 
The beneficiaries of the stock price increase expected under S. 852 will include some of the 
most prominent investment firms in America, as well as others – so-called “vulture” 
investors – who make it a practice to invest in distressed companies specifically in the hope 
of reaping such windfalls. [See Figure 4 and Appendix B] 
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Figure 4 
Examples of Affected Companies’ Largest Shareholders 
For a full listing, see Appendix B 
 
 
Company 
Total Shares 
Outstanding 
 
Significant Owners 
Number of 
Shares 
 
Percentage 
Dow Chemical 953,571,000 Capital Research and Management Co. 78,523,200 8.2%
Ford Motor 
Company 1,830,900,000 Barclays Global Investors N.A. 110,440,449 6.0%
General Motors 564,826,000 State Street Corp. 103,110,017 18.3%
Georgia-Pacific 259,839,000 Barclays Global Investors N.A. 21,439,719 8.3%
Honeywell 670,092,700 State Street Corp. 102,146,357 15.2%
Pfizer 7,460,646,000 Barclays Global Investors N.A. 307,974,599 4.1%
W.R. Grace & 
Co. 57,962,868 Peninsula Capital Advisors LLC 10,765,600 18.6%
Source: www.nasdaq.com 
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The Role of Goldman Sachs in the Legislation Raises 
Significant Questions of Conflict of Interest 
 
Goldman Sachs, a leading Wall Street investment banking firm, has been providing critical 
advice to the Asbestos Study Group (ASG) and the Senate Judiciary Committee since at least 
2003 regarding two crucial matters: The feasibility of financing the proposed trust fund to 
compensate victims, and at what level it should be funded. Goldman Sachs’ role appears to 
be highly unusual – if not inappropriate – because the investment firm has a big stake in the 
legislation’s outcome. 
 
Goldman Sachs has a stake in the outcome via significant holdings in asbestos or Fortune 
500 companies that stand to gain from S. 852. [See Figure 5] The companies stand to see 
their stock prices appreciate considerably (see previous section) and as that happens, 
Goldman Sachs, through its holdings in those companies, will benefit as well. The details of 
Goldman Sachs’ holdings are not publicly available. But in general, the firm stands to benefit 
two ways. If the firm is holding stock for its own account, increases in stock prices will 
increase the value of its holdings, just as a price increase would benefit any stockholder. 
Alternatively, if the firm is holding the stock for investment clients, Goldman Sachs will 
benefit through management fees levied on its clients’ portfolios. As these portfolios increase 
in value, management fees, which often are levied based on a percentage of portfolio value, 
can increase. 
 
At a minimum, this apparent conflict of interest should have been debated at some point 
during consideration of S. 852, but it does not appear this has yet occurred.  
 
Goldman Sachs’ role was up-front and transparent during development of previous 
legislation in 2003 when a broader bipartisan effort was being pursued, according to a senior 
Senate Democratic staff person. The ASG would bring Goldman Sachs employees to meet 
with Senate Judiciary Committee staff to explain how Goldman Sachs’ analysis was being 
done. Goldman Sachs employees were “around regularly” according to the staffer, and even 
“briefed the unions” and “prepared analyses for the unions” to help build consensus before 
the committee began drafting legislation. Goldman Sachs’ role was central to debate on the 
bill, according to the staffer.34 (It is noteworthy that neither Goldman Sachs nor the ASG has 
reported payments made to Goldman Sachs for its work briefing Senate staff members.) 
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Figure 5 
Companies with Significant Asbestos Liability 
In Which Goldman Sachs Has Substantial Investments  
 
Company Shares Value 
Dow Chemical/ 
Union Carbide 2,298,557 $108,998,000 
Ford Motor Company 28,201,925 $267,072,000 
General Electric 35,486,766 $1,281,072,000 
General Motors 1,161,734 $32,261,000 
Georgia Pacific 482,447 $16,837,000 
Honeywell/NARCO 1,273,981 $44,972,000 
Pfizer/Quigley 86,352,564 $2,374,696,000 
USG Corp. 2,088,820 $85,642,000 
Viacom/Westinghouse 51,105,771 $1,794,835,000 
Source: www.nasdaq.com; shares and values as of May 4, 2005. 
 
In 2005, it appears that Goldman Sachs’ role has shifted to a behind-the-scenes effort 
directed at S. 852 supporters. The Democratic staff person said that to their knowledge, the 
firm has not met this year with key Democrats who oppose the 2005 bill.  
 
But Goldman Sachs staff clearly have been aiding the committee. Recently, the company’s 
analyses appear to have been circulated to committee members by Sen. Specter, chairman of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, and were cited authoritatively in the April 26, 2005 
committee hearing on S. 852 and during the April 28, 2005 committee mark-up of the bill. (A 
Senate Judiciary Committee staffer declined a Public Citizen request to provide a copy of 
Goldman Sachs’ financial analysis.) 
 
Excerpts are provided below and are repeated verbatim in Appendix C.35  
 
Judge Becker, Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, April 26:  
 
Now, $140 billion is based upon the Goldman-Sachs translation of the projections (of 
asbestos disease?) from Dr. Fran Rabinovitz, which, (when I?) examined them in 
marathon sessions last May, impressed me as correct. 
 
So it seems to me that there is at least credible evidence, based upon [United States 
District] Judge [John P.] Fullam’s findings, that the Goldman-Sachs figures, which are 
based upon Dr. Rabinovitz’s projections, are sound and that we should have some 
confidence that the fund will be able to meet the claims. 
 
Sen. John Cornyn (R-Texas), Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, April 26: 
 
Other estimates, from Goldman Sachs for example, go up to 82 percent, they estimate, 
will be not eligible for compensation, but will be eligible for medical monitoring.  I think 
we need to drill down and understand better the basis for those estimates. 
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Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan.) and Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), Senate 
Judiciary Committee Mark-up, April 28: 
 
Brownback: This is on the contribution amount…According to numbers that you 
provided to us from Goldman Sachs and some others, were going to raise about $140 
billion in the overall funding scheme … That’s the Goldman-Sachs and others and 
others’ numbers, we’ll raise $140 billion. 
 
Specter: That’s correct. 
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Huge Financial Stakes for ASG Members and Allies Have 
Generated Tremendous Lobbying Activity 
 
In 2001, the political landscape of the asbestos fight changed dramatically when one section of 
the business community turned against another. Tier 1 companies, largely asbestos 
manufacturers, had been fighting for a congressional bailout for years, especially since a 1997 
Supreme Court decision that rejected a proposed settlement structure that would have benefited 
the companies. One such company, GAF, had ramped up its lobbying expenditures from $40,000 
in the first six months of 1997 to $3.2 million in the last six months of 1999, and the company’s 
campaign contributions – including those of the majority owner of the company – had increased 
about 450 percent from $21,750 in 1995 to $119,220 in 1999.36 
 
In 2000 and 2001, however, many of the Tier 1 companies began declaring bankruptcy, and in 
the last quarter of 2001 many injured workers began to sue the Tier 2 companies, which were 
mainly large corporations (or their subsidiaries) that had used asbestos in their products or 
facilities. The Big Three car manufacturers, for example, saw the number of asbestos-related 
claims filed against them jump from 1,743 in the first three quarters of 2001 to 10,379 in the last 
quarter.37 It was at this point that many of the large Tier 2 Fortune 500 companies appear to have 
formed the Asbestos Study Group (ASG) and began pumping tens of millions of dollars into a 
massive lobbying operation. 
 
ASG’s lobbying budget took off from a modest $80,000 in 2001 to $1,180,000 in 2002 to almost 
$11 million in 2003.38 By 2004, ASG was spending $12.1 million lobbying Congress. [See 
Figure 6] All told, it doled out $23.1 million to lobbying firms in 2003 and 2004, and $24.4 
million since 2001 when it was created. Such an amount spent by one group focused exclusively 
on one issue is highly unusual. 
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Figure 6 
Firms Hired by the Asbestos Study Group to Lobby on  
Federal Asbestos Legislation, 2003-2004 
 
Organization 2003 Lobbying Expenditures 
2004 Lobbying 
Expenditures 
Total Lobbying 
Expenditures 
Swidler Berlin 
Shereff Friedman* $10,060,000 $11,080,000** $21,140,000 
McGuiness & 
Holch $440,000 $400,000 $840,000 
Clark Consulting 
Federal Policy 
Group 
$200,000 $200,000 $400,000 
Alexander Strategy 
Group $120,000 $240,000** $360,000 
Capitol Tax 
Partners $140,000 $200,000** $340,000 
Wexler & Walker N/A $20,000 $20,000 
Total $10,960,000 $12,140,000 $23,100,000 
 
Source: Public Citizen’s analysis of lobbying disclosure forms available from the Senate Office of Public Records. 
*The Asbestos Study Group also paid Swidler Berlin $80,000 in 2001 and $1,180,000 in 2002. 
 ** Projected figure: Company’s form for the second half of 2004 is not on file at the U.S. House or U.S. Senate 
lobbying disclosure offices, which could be due to a lag in data entry. Public Citizen requested the data directly from 
the firm and did not receive a response before publication. The projected figure was calculated by doubling the 
lobbying revenue from the first half of 2004. 
 
Public Citizen estimates that ASG, six Tier 1 bankrupt asbestos companies and seven Tier 2 
Fortune 500 companies spent a combined $144.5 million lobbying Congress from 2003 through 
2004, the latest figures available. [See Figure 7] The amount spent by ASG and the Tier 1 
companies during those years – $27.9 million – was probably almost exclusively to pass asbestos 
bailout legislation. The $86.6 million spent by the Fortune 500 companies was for asbestos 
legislation and other matters; but lobby disclosure forms do not provide a breakdown of each 
issue or bill category. But the sum spent on asbestos work for some of the Fortune 500 
companies had to be considerable given the number of lobbyists they employed who described 
working on this issue.  
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Figure 7 
Asbestos Study Group Members & Allies 
That Lobbied on Federal Asbestos Legislation, 2003-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Public Citizen’s analysis of lobbying disclosure forms available from the Senate Office of Public Records. 
* Figure is based on the lobbying disclosure forms filed by firms hired by the Asbestos Study Group. See Figure 6. 
** Projected figure: Company’s form for the second half of 2004 is not on file at the U.S. House or U.S. Senate 
lobbying disclosure offices, which could be due to a lag in data entry. Public Citizen requested the data directly from 
the firm and did not receive a response before publication. The projected figure was calculated by doubling the 
lobbying revenue from the first half of 2004.   
 
 
The ASG is remarkable in that it concentrated more than 90 percent of its lobbying dollars on a 
solely Democratic-connected lobbying firm, the D.C.-based Swidler Berlin Sherref & Friedman 
and its lobbying arm, the Harbour Group. The Harbour Group is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Swidler Berlin and was created in 2001 as an explicitly Democratic lobbying firm based around 
several high-level staffers who were leaving the White House at the end of President Clinton’s 
second term.39   
 
The Harbour Group is run by Managing Partners Richard Marcus and Joel Johnson. Johnson was 
Clinton’s senior advisor for policy and communications, and the chief legislative and 
communications advisor to the Senate’s former top Democrat, Sen. Tom Daschle (D-S.D.). 
Johnson is also a former Senate Judiciary Committee staffer.40 
 
Organization 2003 Lobbying Expenditures 
2004 Lobbying 
Expenditures 
Total Lobbying 
Expenditures 
    
Asbestos Study 
Group $10,960,000 $12,140,000* $23,100,000 
    
Tier I – Bankruptcy 
Companies    
GAF $160,000 $360,000 $520,000 
G-I Holdings $520,000 $500,000 $1,020,000 
Kaiser Aluminum and 
Chemical Co. $463,720 $150,000 $613,720 
Owens-Corning $1,321,570 $743,436** $2,065,006 
USG Corp. N/A $200,000** $200,000 
W.R. Grace & Co. $220,000 $120,000** $340,000 
Subtotal $2,685,290 $2,073,436 $4,758,726 
    
Tier II – Fortune 500 
Companies    
Dow Chemical 
Company $1,800,000 $1,800,000 $3,600,000 
Ford Motor Company $4,640,000 $7,200,000 $11,840,000 
General Electric $17,200,000 $16,240,000 $33,440,000 
General Motors $7,940,000 $8,500,000 $16,440,000 
Honeywell/NARCO $4,640,000 $4,600,000** $9,240,000 
Pfizer/Quigley $3,720,000 $5,660,000 $9,380,000 
Viacom/ 
Westinghouse $1,250,000 $1,400,000 $2,650,000 
Subtotal $41,190,000 $45,460,000 $86,590,000 
    
Total $54,835,290 $59,673,436 $114,448,726 
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The Harbour Group was also stacked with four other former Senate Judiciary Committee 
staffers, including Thurgood Marshall, Jr., a former assistant to the president and Cabinet 
secretary for President Clinton, and director of legislative affairs for Vice President Al Gore. Six 
other Harbour Group employees have worked in other Senate offices, all but two for Democrats.  
 
In the first half of 2004, the last period for which complete records are available, the ASG gave 
the Harbour Group $5.5 million for its services – the single largest lobbying contract awarded by 
any corporation or association in that period. While individual corporations and trade 
associations spent more on their cumulative lobbying budget over the same period, the next-
highest lobbying contract topped out at only $1.4 million.41 Per day, the ASG spent $30,356 for 
Harbour’s services in that period. 
 
Another recipient of an ASG contract, the Alexander Strategy Group, received its contract six 
days after it formed a “strategic partnership” with the Harbour Group to handle the Republican 
side of the aisle in Congress in October 2002.42 That firm has its own Senate connection in 
chairman Ed Buckham, a former chief of staff to House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Texas). 
Buckham is also a former staffer for Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) – who currently sits on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee – and former chief of staff of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Administrative Practice and Procedure.43 
 
In March 2003, a breakthrough occurred when the AFL-CIO announced it had begun to 
negotiate a compromise with the ASG.44 The ASG was likely helped by the fact that Harbour 
Group staffers would have worked a great deal with the unions while they worked in Congress 
and for the Clinton administration. The prospect of union support for a bill meant a possible 
break in the stalemate that had denied Republicans the 60 votes needed to break a filibuster in 
order to conference a bill with the House, which had already passed asbestos legislation. After 
two more years of heavy lobbying, in April 2005, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) announced he 
would join Sen. Specter in pushing the ASG-supported bill, setting up the Tier 2 companies for 
their ultimate Congressional victory. 
 
ASG and the handful of companies in Tiers 1 and 2 employed a small army of 168 individual 
lobbyists during 2003 and 2004 to work on asbestos legislation. Pfizer reported 45 lobbyists 
working the issue, Dow Chemical had 20, General Motors and Honeywell had 18 each, and 
General Electric reported 12. [See Figure 8 and Appendix D for a complete list.] 
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Figure 8 
Number of Lobbyists Who Worked On Federal Asbestos Legislation 
On Behalf of Asbestos Study Group Members & Allies, 2003-2004 
 
Client Name 2003 2004 Total* 
Asbestos Study Group    
Alexander Strategy Group 10 8 11 
Capitol Tax Partners 5 6 6 
Clark Consulting Federal Policy Group 9 8 9 
McGuiness & Holch 1 1 1 
Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman 10 10 10 
Wexler & Walker Public Policy 
Associates N/A 3 3 
Subtotal 35 36 40 
    
Tier I – Bankruptcy Companies    
GAF 1 1 1 
G-I Holdings Inc. 3 2 3 
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Co. 1 3 4 
Owens-Corning 7 1 7 
USG Corp. 3 3 3 
W.R. Grace & Co. 1 1 1 
Subtotal 15 9 19 
    
Tier II – Fortune 500 Companies    
Dow Chemical Company/Union Carbide 14 20 20 
Ford Motor Company 3 7 7 
General Electric Company 10 9 12 
General Motors 17 12 18 
Honeywell/NARCO 15 14 18 
Pfizer/Quigley 36 35 45 
Viacom/Westinghouse 3 2 3 
Subtotal 91 98 116 
    
Total 135 143 168 
Source: Public Citizen’s analysis of lobbying disclosure forms available from the Senate Office of Public Records. 
*Total column does not equal the sum of previous years because some lobbyists worked on asbestos issues 
in both 2003 and 2004 and also worked for more than one client. 
 
Of the 168 lobbyists, Public Citizen counts 94 – or 57.7 percent – who walked through the 
“revolving door” from government service to the private sector, including seven former members 
of Congress. [See Figure 9 and Appendix E for a complete list] 
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Figure 9 
Former Members of Congress Who Lobbied on Federal Asbestos Legislation 
On Behalf of Asbestos Study Group Members and Allies, 2003-2004 
 
Lobbyist  Client Name Firm Name 
Dennis DeConcini Owens-Corning Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms 
Dennis DeConcini Pfizer Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms 
Daniel Robert 
Glickman 
Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld 
Ed Jenkins Pfizer Palmetto Group 
Norman Lent Pfizer Lent Scrivner & Roth 
Lauch Faircloth Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld 
Bill Paxon Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld 
Steve Symms Owens-Corning Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms 
Steve Symms Pfizer Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms 
Source: Public Citizen analysis of lobbying disclosure reports filed with Senate Office of Public Records.  
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 Appendix A 
Asbestos Study Group Members & Allies 
 
 
Tier 1 Allies: Pending Bankruptcy Companies 
A.P. Greene 
Armstrong World Industries 
Babcock & Wilcox  
Combustion Engineering 
Flintkote 
G-I Industries/GAF 
NARCO/Honeywell  
Kaiser Aluminum 
Owens Corning/Fibreboard 
Pittsburgh Corning 
USG Corp. 
W.R. Grace & Co.  
 
Note:  
Honeywell is not a Chapter 11 bankruptcy company; however, it would fall into Tier 2 because it 
has agreed in principle to fund the NARCO 524(g) bankruptcy trust. Its trust share is estimated at 
$426.6 million.  
 
Tier 2 ASG Members: Fortune 500 Companies 
*Dow Chemical/Union Carbide 
*Ford Motor Company  
*General Electric 
*General Motors 
Georgia Pacific 
*Honeywell 
Owens Illinois 
*Pfizer/Quigley 
*Viacom/Westinghouse 
 
*Confirmed ASG members identified in 2003 Senate testimony as being in the Asbestos Study 
Group. Honeywell was noted in “Statement from the Asbestos Study Group,” Asbestos Study 
Group press release, April 18, 2005. 
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Appendix B 
Major Shareholders of Companies With Asbestos Liabilities 
(Alphabetically by shareholder) 
 
Company Total Shares Outstanding Major Shareholder 
Number of 
Shares Percentage 
Owens Illinois N/A A.R. Schmeidler & Co. Inc. 268,212 N/A
McDermott 
International/ 
Babcock & 
Wilcox 
67,457,000 American Express Financial Corp. 3,451,000 5.1%
W.R. Grace & 
Co. 57,962,868 
Ardsley Advisory Partners 2,995,000 5.2%
Viacom 131,503,000 AXA 1,738,518 1.3%
Dow 953,571,000 Barclays Global Investors N.A. 34,464,813 3.6%
Ford Motor 
Company 1,830,900,000 Barclays Global Investors N.A. 110,440,449 6.0%
General Motors 564,826,000 Barclays Global Investors N.A. 21,597,863 3.8%
Georgia-Pacific 259,839,000 Barclays Global Investors N.A. 21,439,719 8.3%
Honeywell 670,092,700 Barclays Global Investors N.A. 29,669,449 4.4%
Kaiser-
Aluminum 533,660 
Barclays Global Investors N.A. 43,545 8.2%
Owens Corning 7,156,403 Barclays Global Investors N.A. 225,694 3.2%
Pfizer 7,460,646,000 Barclays Global Investors N.A. 307,974,599 4.1%
PPG Industries 173,203,000 Barclays Global Investors N.A. 9,590,319 5.5%
USG 
Corporation/ 
U.S. Gypsum 
43,343,000 Barclays Global Investors N.A. 1,835,451 4.2%
W.R. Grace & 
Co. 57,962,868 
Barclays Global Investors N.A. 3,605,800 6.2%
USG 
Corporation/ 
U.S. Gypsum 
43,343,000 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 6,500,000 15.0%
Ford Motor 
Company 1,830,900,000 Brandes Investment Partners L.P. 48,624,464 2.7%
General Motors 564,826,000 Brandes Investment Partners L.P. 16,675,566 3.0%
Kaiser-
Aluminum 533,660 
California Public Employees 
Retirement System 
458,100 
 85.8%
Dow 953,571,000 Capital Research and Management Co. 78,523,200 8.2%
General Motors 564,826,000 Capital Research and Management Co. 64,730,400 11.5%
Georgia-Pacific 259,839,000 Capital Research and Management Co. 19,735,898 7.6%
PPG Industries 173,203,000 Capital Research and Management Co. 4,850,000 2.8%
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Viacom 131,503,000 Capital Research and Management Co. 850,000 0.6%
Owens Corning 7,156,403 
Catalyst Investment Management 
Co. LLC 289,300 4.0%
Armstrong World 
Industries 437,076 
Caz Investments L.P. 400 0.1%
Honeywell 670,092,700 Citigroup Inc. 25,567,179 3.8%
PPG Industries 173,203,000 Citigroup Inc. 4,280,499 2.5%
USG 
Corporation/ 
U.S. Gypsum 
43,343,000 D.E. Shaw & Co. Inc. 2,839,800 6.6%
W.R. Grace & 
Co. 57,962,868 D.E. Shaw & Co. Inc. 3,066,900 5.3%
Dow 953,571,000 Deutsche Bank AG 37,067,552 3.9%
Honeywell 670,092,700 Deutsche Bank AG 25,311,554 3.8%
Kaiser-
Aluminum 533,660 
DFA Investment Dimensions 
Group Inc. 30,015 5.6%
Dow 953,571,000 Dodge & Cox 36,161,059 3.8%
ABB 
Ltd./Combustion 
Engineering 
2,070,315,000 
 
FMR Corp. 1,925,600 0.1%
Dow 953,571,000 FMR Corp. 32,770,324 3.4%
Honeywell 670,092,700 FMR Corp. 50,498,578 7.5%
Owens Illinois N/A FMR Corp. 857,080 
Pfizer 7,460,646,000 FMR Corp. 280,618,003 3.8%
USG 
Corporation/ 
U.S. Gypsum 
43,343,000 
 
FMR Corp. 5,548,300 12.8%
Viacom 131,503,000 Gabelli Asset Management  Inc. 8,953,368 6.8%
McDermott 
International/ 
Babcock & 
Wilcox 
67,457,000 Glenview Capital Management LLC 3,635,200 5.4%
Ford Motor 
Company 1,830,900,000 Goldman Sachs 28,201,925 1.5%
USG 
Corporation/ 
U.S. Gypsum 
43,343,000 Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 2,088,820 4.8%
ABB 
Ltd./Combustion 
Engineering 
2,070,315,000 IXIS Asset Management Advisors L.P. 3,160,383 0.2%
Owens Corning 7,156,403 JGD Management Corp. 550,000 7.7%
Armstrong World 
Industries 437,076 
Kensico Capital Management 
Corp. 160,800 36.8%
Owens Corning 7,156,403 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 7,156,403 100.0%
Armstrong World 
Industries 437,076 
Loeb Arbitrage Management Inc. 275,876 63.1%
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Owens Illinois N/A Loomis Sayles & Co. LP 652,127 
Georgia-Pacific 259,839,000 Lord Abbett & Co 10,069,147 3.9%
Owens Illinois N/A Lord Abbett & Co. 869,842 
Viacom 131,503,000 Marathon Asset Management Co. 1,491,100 1.1%
PPG Industries 173,203,000 Massachusetts Financial Services Co. 6,145,956 3.5%
ABB 
Ltd./Combustion 
Engineering 
2,070,315,000 McLean Budden Ltd. 5,545,200 0.3%
McDermott 
International/ 
Babcock & 
Wilcox 
67,457,000 Merrill Lynch Asset Management Inc. 4,131,000 6.1%
Owens Corning 7,156,403 Moore Capital Management LLC 525,000 7.3%
Georgia-Pacific 259,839,000 Morgan Stanley 18,551,995 7.1%
ABB 
Ltd./Combustion 
Engineering 
2,070,315,000 Neuberger Berman LLC 7,962,560 0.4%
W.R. Grace & 
Co. 57,962,868 Peninsula Capital Advisors LLC 10,765,600 18.6%
Owens Illinois N/A Price T. Rowe Associates Inc. 578,100 
Kaiser-
Aluminum 533,660 
Schwab Charles Investment 
Management Inc. 2,000 0.4%
McDermott 
International/ 
Babcock & 
Wilcox 
67,457,000 Seemore Advisors LLC 2,600,000 3.9%
General Motors 564,826,000 Southeastern Asset Management Inc. 26,029,493 4.6%
Ford Motor 
Company 1,830,900,000 State Street Corp. 62,015,564 3.4%
General Motors 564,826,000 State Street Corp. 103,110,017 18.3%
Georgia-Pacific 259,839,000 State Street Corp. 10,760,324 4.1%
Honeywell 670,092,700 State Street Corp. 102,146,357 15.2%
Pfizer 7,460,646,000 State Street Corp. 243,328,658 3.3%
PPG Industries 173,203,000 State Street Corp. 5,446,066 3.1%
Viacom 131,503,000 
Teachers Insurance and Annuity 
Association - College Retirement 
Equities Fund 
876,894 0.7%
McDermott 
International/ 
Babcock & 
Wilcox 
67,457,000 Third Point LLC 4,225,000 6.3%
Ford Motor 
Company 1,830,900,000 Vanguard Group Inc. 39,628,820 2.2%
Pfizer 7,460,646,000 Vanguard Group Inc. 168,387,081 2.3%
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W.R. Grace & 
Co. 57,962,868 
Vanguard Group Inc. 2,539,072 4.4%
ABB 
Ltd./Combustion 
Engineering 
2,070,315,000 Wedge Capital Management LLP. 2,903,600 0.1%
Pfizer 7,460,646,000 Wellington Management Co. LLP 144,538,845 1.9%
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Appendix C 
Goldman Sachs References in Senate Judiciary Hearing 
And Bill Mark-up of April 26 and 28, 2005 
 
Judiciary Committee Hearing, April 26, 2005 
 
JUDGE EDWARD BECKER, THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS: As I said previously -
- (inaudible) -- financial experts have demonstrated that the fund was more than adequate to pay 
the projected claims.  New figures from Goldman-Sachs represent that by elimination of level 
seven, even with the increase in the claim value, the fund is at least $5 billion more secure than 
before, which I hope will give assurance to those senators who have expressed concerns about 
the solvency of the fund.  (Inaudible) -- current bill is estimated to be $120 billion, and the fund 
is $140 billion.  The first five-year outflow is within the (up-front money?). 
 
Now, $140 billion is based upon the Goldman-Sachs translation of the projections (of asbestos 
disease?) from Dr. Fran Rabinovitz, which, (when I?) examined them in marathon sessions last 
May, impressed me as correct.  Now, I know that there will be testimony today that those figures 
are off.  That's the testimony of Mr. Peterson, which will be countered, as I understand, by Dr. 
Rabinovitz. I note, (for the benefit of the panel?), that the very recent figures show a significant 
decline in claims.  (Inaudible) -- one of the major companies (with respect to?) liability claims, 
are down 70 percent in the last two years. 
 
 
JUDGE EDWARD BECKER, THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS: So it seems to me that 
there is at least credible evidence, based upon Judge Fullam’s (sp) findings, that the Goldman-
Sachs figures, which are based upon Dr. Rabinovitz’s projections, are sound and that we should 
have some confidence that the fund will be able to meet the claims. 
 
 
SEN. LEAHY: A major component of the bill is to ensure that the fund is operational through 
higher front-end fundings, something you've looked at closely.  In your testimony to the 
committee in January and then some of the follow-up letters to me, you stated that you expect to 
have written commitments or letters from financial institutions regarding the availability of 20 
billion (dollars) in front-end funding once the legislation was introduced, including estimates of 
the interest costs of such potential borrowing.  Now that we've introduced it, when do you expect 
to receive such written assurances from financial institutions?  
 
JOHN ENGLER, PRESIDENT AND CEO, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
MANUFACTURING: The specificity of the draft that makes this easier as it gets, obviously, 
closer, but we think by Thursday from Goldman Sachs we may have a letter that gives us 
assurances.  We've been talking to a lot of the different financial houses about how this gets 
done.  We think this is clearly bankable.  But we're anticipating that Thursday we would have 
something in time for markup, that you'd have a commitment on, you know -- and it's really 
couched, I suppose, as financial folks do, based on what exactly the mechanisms are. But we 
think that the committee has done a nice job in the draft of trying to put a framework together 
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that somebody like Goldman Sachs can kind of come in and say this is what we think it would 
be. 
 
 
SEN. JOHN CORNYN (R-TX):  …………. And there are a number of provisions in this very 
lengthy bill -- and again, this has been a complex, contentious process, I think as Judge Becker 
said, and we have all tried very hard and continue to try very hard to deal with some of the 
challenges there.  I am concerned that we still do not yet have a good, solid information that 
allows us to predict the viability of the fund.  I would just note, and I'll look forward to additional 
testimony we have here later, that the CBO, for example, on a previous version of this bill 
estimated that about 76 percent of the people who apply for benefits will not be eligible for 
compensation, but will be eligible for medical monitoring.  Other estimates, from Goldman 
Sachs for example, go up to 82 percent, they estimate, will be not eligible for compensation, but 
will be eligible for medical monitoring.  I think we need to drill down and understand better the 
basis for those estimates. 
 
Judiciary Committee Hearing, April 26, 2005 
SEN. SPECTER: You're testimony about the amount of the fund, as I understand it, is that before 
the Section VIIs were eliminated, your expert projections came in at a total cost to cover all the 
claims of $125 billion.  Is that correct? 
DR. FRANCINE RABINOVITZ, HAMILTON, RABINOVITZ & ALSCHULER: Yes, although 
the value side of that equation is estimated by Goldman Sachs. 
 
Judiciary Committee Markup, April 28, 2005 
 
U.S. SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK (R-KS): BROWNBACK: All right.  So this is set now.  
You can't go back and forth on this? 
 
U.S. SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER: Correct.  Once the trial has started, a jury impaneled, 
bench trial, evidence presented, it stays in court. 
BROWNBACK: All right.  Could I call up then a different one, my amendment number four.  
This is on the contribution amount. 
And I'd really appreciate it, Chairman, if you can look at this. 
According to numbers that you provided to us from Goldman Sachs and some others, were 
going to raise about $140 billion in the overall funding scheme. 
BROWNBACK: The numbers you have provided as well -- it looks like to me, if we get 
$125 billion, we're going to spend, with Level 7 claimants in the fund, and $118 billion if they're 
out of the fund. 
That's the Goldman-Sachs and others and others' numbers, we'll raise $140 billion. 
SPECTER: That's correct.
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Appendix D 
Lobbyists Who Worked on Federal Asbestos Legislation 
For ASG and Fortune 500 Companies Studied, 2003-2004 
 
Client Name Firm Name Lobbyist 
Asbestos Study Group Alexander Strategy Group Terry Allen  
Asbestos Study Group Alexander Strategy Group Chris Bertelli  
Asbestos Study Group Alexander Strategy Group Edwin A Buckham  
Asbestos Study Group Alexander Strategy Group Brian Darling  
Asbestos Study Group Alexander Strategy Group Karl Gallant  
Asbestos Study Group Alexander Strategy Group Dan Gans  
Asbestos Study Group Alexander Strategy Group Terry Haines  
Asbestos Study Group Alexander Strategy Group Jim Hayes  
Asbestos Study Group Alexander Strategy Group Mike Minalke  
Asbestos Study Group Alexander Strategy Group Tony Rudy  
Asbestos Study Group Alexander Strategy Group Ed Stewart  
Asbestos Study Group Capitol Tax Partners William Fant  
Asbestos Study Group Capitol Tax Partners Richard Grafmeyer  
Asbestos Study Group Capitol Tax Partners Lindsay Hooper  
Asbestos Study Group Capitol Tax Partners William McKenney  
Asbestos Study Group Capitol Tax Partners Joseph "Joe" Mikrut  
Asbestos Study Group Capitol Tax Partners Jonathan Talisman  
Asbestos Study Group Clark Consulting Federal Policy Group James F. Carlisle  
Asbestos Study Group Clark Consulting Federal Policy Group Jayne Fitzgerald  
Asbestos Study Group Clark Consulting Federal Policy Group Tim Hanford  
Asbestos Study Group Clark Consulting Federal Policy Group Kenneth J. Kies  
Asbestos Study Group Clark Consulting Federal Policy Group Dan Leonard  
Asbestos Study Group Clark Consulting Federal Policy Group Rob Leonard  
Asbestos Study Group Clark Consulting Federal Policy Group John Meagher  
Asbestos Study Group Clark Consulting Federal Policy Group Scott Parven  
Asbestos Study Group Clark Consulting Federal Policy Group Pat Raffaniello  
Asbestos Study Group McGuiness & Holch Kevin McGuiness  
Asbestos Study Group Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman Bernard P. Bell  
Asbestos Study Group Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman Barry Direnfeld  
Asbestos Study Group Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman Brian Fitzgerald  
Asbestos Study Group Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman Sandra P. Franco  
Asbestos Study Group Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman Gary Gallant  
Asbestos Study Group Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman Thurgood Marshall Jr. 
Asbestos Study Group Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman Linda S. Schmidt  
Asbestos Study Group Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman Gary Slaiman  
Asbestos Study Group Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman Kathryn Taylor  
Asbestos Study Group Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman Michael B. Wigmore  
Asbestos Study Group Wexler & Walker Public Policy Associates Peter Holran  
Asbestos Study Group Wexler & Walker Public Policy Associates Jack Howard  
Asbestos Study Group Wexler & Walker Public Policy Associates Robert Walker  
Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld J. David Carlin  
Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Smith Davis  
Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Lauch Faircloth  
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Client Name Firm Name Lobbyist 
Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Daniel Robert Glickman  
Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Karen Goldmeier Green  
Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Christine F. Hesse  
Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Joel Jankowsky  
Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Charles Johnson IV  
Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Alexander 'Sandy' Kress  
Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Bill Paxon  
Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Steven Ross  
Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld John M. Simmons  
Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Barney Skladany  
Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld James Tucker  
Dow Chemical Company Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Jose Villarreal  
Dow Chemical Company Baker & Daniels Phillip E. Bainbridge  
Dow Chemical Company Dow Chemical Company Louis Vega  
Dow Chemical Company Dow Chemical Company Theodore "Ted" F. Verheggen 
Dow Chemical Company Hamilton Rabinovitz & Alschuler Francine F. Rabinovitz  
Dow Chemical Company James L. Stengel James L. Stengel  
Ford Motor Company Ford Motor Company Dan Brouillette  
Ford Motor Company Ford Motor Company Janet Mullins Grissom  
Ford Motor Company Ford Motor Company Mary Johannes  
Ford Motor Company Ford Motor Company Alison Jones  
Ford Motor Company Ford Motor Company Ziad Ojakli  
Ford Motor Company Ford Motor Company Tony Reinhart  
Ford Motor Company Ford Motor Company Gerald Roussel  
GAF Levine & Company Ken Levine  
General Electric Company General Electric Company Larry A. Boggs  
General Electric Company General Electric Company Nancy Dorn  
General Electric Company General Electric Company Kathryn Fulton  
General Electric Company General Electric Company Ellen L. Goldstein  
General Electric Company General Electric Company Dennis LaGanza  
General Electric Company General Electric Company Neil Messick  
General Electric Company General Electric Company Glenn Pomeroy  
General Electric Company General Electric Company Peter D. Prowitt  
General Electric Company General Electric Company John Schaeffler  
General Electric Company General Electric Company Lynn H. Thomson  
General Electric Company PodestaMattoon Anthony Podesta  
General Electric Company Troutman Sanders L.L.P. Robert Leebern Jr. 
General Electric Company Troutman Sanders L.L.P. Laura Quattlebaum  
General Motors Duberstein Group III, John Angus  
General Motors Duberstein Group Michael S. Berman  
General Motors Duberstein Group Steven M. Champlin  
General Motors Duberstein Group Kenneth M. Duberstein  
General Motors Duberstein Group Henry M. Gandy  
General Motors Duberstein Group Daniel Meyer  
General Motors General Motors Mel J. Bazemore  
General Motors General Motors Ken Cole  
General Motors General Motors Keith Cole  
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Client Name Firm Name Lobbyist 
General Motors General Motors Lewis Dale  
General Motors General Motors Stephen G. Gehring  
General Motors General Motors Mark Kemmer  
General Motors General Motors William Kemp  
General Motors General Motors Michele Lieber  
General Motors General Motors Elizabeth Lowery  
General Motors General Motors Stephen O'Toole  
General Motors General Motors Frederick Sciance  
General Motors General Motors Thomas Walton  
G-I Holdings Inc. G-I Holdings Inc. Peter J. Ganz  
G-I Holdings Inc. G-I Holdings Inc. Eric Weinberg  
G-I Holdings Inc. G-I Holdings Inc. Richard A. Weinberg  
Honeywell International Inc. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Smith Davis  
Honeywell International Inc. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Karen Goldmeier Green  
Honeywell International Inc. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld Steven Ross  
Honeywell International Inc. Honeywell International Inc. Christine Ciccone  
Honeywell International Inc. Honeywell International Inc. Brian Griffin  
Honeywell International Inc. Honeywell International Inc. Timothy Keating  
Honeywell International Inc. Honeywell International Inc. Frank Keating  
Honeywell International Inc. Honeywell International Inc. Jeff Kuhnreich  
Honeywell International Inc. Honeywell International Inc. Michael Naylor  
Honeywell International Inc. Honeywell International Inc. Sean O'Hallaren  
Honeywell International Inc. Honeywell International Inc. Paul Zurawski  
Honeywell International Inc. OB-C Group Michael S. Johnson  
Honeywell International Inc. OB-C Group Thomas Keating  
Honeywell International Inc. OB-C Group Robert H. Marsh  
Honeywell International Inc. OB-C Group Charles J. Mellody  
Honeywell International Inc. OB-C Group Patricia A. Nelson  
Honeywell International Inc. OB-C Group Lawrence O'Brien III  
Honeywell International Inc. OB-C Group Mary Ellen Ruhlen  
Honeywell International Inc. OB-C Group Linda E. Tarplin  
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Co. BKSH & Associates Mark Disler  
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Co. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Co. Mark Disler  
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Co. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Co. John Kyte  
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Co. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Co. K. Riva Levinson  
Owens-Corning Owens-Corning John Libonari  
Owens-Corning Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms Edward Baxter  
Owens-Corning Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms Dennis DeConcini  
Owens-Corning Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms John Haddow  
Owens-Corning Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms James Rock  
Owens-Corning Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms Romano Romani  
Owens-Corning Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms Steve Symms  
Pfizer/Quigley Arnold & Porter Robert Weiner  
Pfizer/Quigley Canfield & Associates Roger Blauwet  
Pfizer/Quigley Canfield & Associates April Boston  
Pfizer/Quigley Canfield & Associates Anne Canfield  
Pfizer/Quigley Canfield & Associates Erin Frederick  
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Client Name Firm Name Lobbyist 
Pfizer/Quigley Capitol Health Group Michael Bromberg  
Pfizer/Quigley Capitol Health Group Shawn Coughlin  
Pfizer/Quigley Capitol Health Group Steve Jenning  
Pfizer/Quigley Capitol Health Group Layna Peltier  
Pfizer/Quigley Duberstein Group John Angus III 
Pfizer/Quigley Duberstein Group Michael S. Berman  
Pfizer/Quigley Duberstein Group Steven M. Champlin  
Pfizer/Quigley Duberstein Group Henry M. Gandy  
Pfizer/Quigley Duberstein Group Daniel Meyer  
Pfizer/Quigley Lent Scrivner & Roth Louis Finkel  
Pfizer/Quigley Lent Scrivner & Roth Norman Lent  
Pfizer/Quigley Lent Scrivner & Roth Norman Lent III  
Pfizer/Quigley Lent Scrivner & Roth Alan Roth  
Pfizer/Quigley Lent Scrivner & Roth Michael Scrivner  
Pfizer/Quigley Palmetto Group Steve Glaze  
Pfizer/Quigley Palmetto Group Ed Jenkins  
Pfizer/Quigley Palmetto Group Chad Jenkins  
Pfizer/Quigley Palmetto Group Michael Prucker  
Pfizer/Quigley Palmetto Group David Rudd  
Pfizer/Quigley Palmetto Group John Winburn  
Pfizer/Quigley Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms Edward Baxter  
Pfizer/Quigley Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms Dennis DeConcini  
Pfizer/Quigley Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms John Haddow  
Pfizer/Quigley Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms James Rock  
Pfizer/Quigley Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms Romano Romani  
Pfizer/Quigley Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms Thaddeus Strom  
Pfizer/Quigley Parry, Romani, DeConcini & Symms Steve Symms  
Pfizer/Quigley Pfizer Rich Bagger  
Pfizer/Quigley Pfizer Alan Bennett  
Pfizer/Quigley Pfizer Catherine Bennett  
Pfizer/Quigley Pfizer Kenneth Bowler  
Pfizer/Quigley Pfizer Michael Boyd  
Pfizer/Quigley Pfizer Charles Hardwick  
Pfizer/Quigley Pfizer Justin McCarthy  
Pfizer/Quigley Pfizer James McCarthy  
Pfizer/Quigley PodestaMattoon Anthony Podesta  
Pfizer/Quigley Ricchetti Inc. James Heinbach  
Pfizer/Quigley Ricchetti Inc. Lisa Kountoupes  
Pfizer/Quigley Ricchetti Inc. Steve Ricchetti  
Pfizer/Quigley Ricchetti Inc. Jeff Ricchetti  
USG Corporation USG Corporation Robert Bell  
USG Corporation USG Corporation Stanley L. Ferguson  
USG Corporation USG Corporation Robert E. Williams  
Viacom/Westinghouse Viacom Gail MacKinnon  
Viacom/Westinghouse Viacom Carol Melton  
Viacom/Westinghouse Viacom David Sutphen  
W.R. Grace & Co. Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz James Range  
Source: Public Citizen’s analysis of lobbying disclosure forms available from the Senate Office of Public Records. 
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Appendix E 
Lobbyists Who Are Former Government Employees and 
 Who Worked on Federal Asbestos Legislation for ASG and  
Fortune 500 Companies Studied, 2003-2004 
 
Lobbyist Firm/Company Client Name “Revolving Door” Connection 
Terry Allen  Alexander 
Strategy Group 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Legislative Liaison, Department of 
Education. 
Chief of Staff, Rep. Steve Largent (R-
Okla.). 
Legislative Assistant, Rep. Clyde Holloway 
(R-La.). 
Edward Baxter  Parry, Romani, 
DeConcini & 
Symms 
Pfizer, Owens-
Corning 
Chief Counsel and Staff Director, 
Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights, and 
Trademarks 
Alan Bennett  Pfizer Pfizer Counsel, Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). 
 Legislative Assistant, Sen. Jacob Javits (R-
N.Y.). 
Counsel, Senate Subcommittee on Energy, 
Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services. 
Michael S. 
Berman  
Duberstein 
Group 
Pfizer, General 
Motors 
Aide, Vice President Walter Mondale. 
Roger Blauwet  Canfield & 
Associates 
Pfizer Tax Counsel, Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.). 
Kenneth Bowler  Pfizer Pfizer Staff Director, House Ways and Means 
Committee. 
Michael 
Bromberg  
Capitol Health 
Group 
Pfizer Legislative Assistant and Administrative 
Assistant, Rep. Herbert Tenzer (D-N.Y.). 
Dan Brouillette  Ford Motor 
Company 
Ford Motor 
Company 
Legislative director, Rep. W.J. “Billy” Tauzin 
(R-La.). 
Assistant Secretary for Congressional and 
Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of 
Energy. 
Majority Staff Director, House Energy and 
Commerce Committee. 
Edwin A 
Buckham  
Alexander 
Strategy Group 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Chief of Staff, Rep. Tom DeLay (R-Texas). 
J. David Carlin  Akin, Gump, 
Strauss, Hauer 
& Feld 
Dow Chemical 
Company 
Assistant Secretary for Congressional 
Relations, Department of Agriculture. 
Campaign Aide, Rep. Jim Slattery (D-Kan.). 
Steven M. 
Champlin  
Duberstein 
Group 
Pfizer, General 
Motors 
Executive Floor Assistant, House Majority 
Whip.  
Executive Director, House Democratic 
Caucus 
Christine 
Ciccone  
Honeywell 
International 
Inc. 
Honeywell 
International Inc. 
Aide, White House Office of Legislative 
Affairs. 
Aide, Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska). 
Keith Cole General Motors General Motors Environmental Counsel, Senate Small 
Business Committee. 
Shawn 
Coughlin  
Capitol Health 
Group 
Pfizer Professional Staff, House Ways and Means 
Committee Health Subcommittee. 
Senior Health Policy Adviser, Rep. Nancy 
Johnson (R-Conn.). 
Legislative Assistant, Rep. Fred Grandy (R-
Iowa). 
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Brian Darling  Alexander 
Strategy Group 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Aide, Sen. Paul Coverdell (R-Ga.). 
Counsel, Senate Judiciary Committee. 
Aide, Sen. Steve Symms (R-Idaho). 
Counsel, Sen. Robert Smith (R-N.H.) 
Smith Davis  Akin, Gump, 
Strauss, Hauer 
& Feld 
Honeywell 
International Inc., 
Dow Chemical 
Company 
Counsel, House Judiciary Committee. 
General Counsel, Women's Senate 
Republican Victory Committee. 
Dennis 
DeConcini  
Parry, Romani, 
DeConcini & 
Symms 
Pfizer, Owens-
Corning 
U.S. Senator (D-Ariz.), 1977-1994. 
Barry Direnfeld Swidler Berlin 
Shereff 
Friedman 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Chief of Staff & Chief Counsel, Sen. 
Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH). 
Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, 
Monopolies, and Business. 
Mark Disler  Kaiser 
Aluminum and 
Chemical Co. 
 
BKSH & 
Associates 
Kaiser Aluminum 
and Chemical Co. 
 
 
Kaiser Aluminum 
and Chemical Co. 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Civil 
Rights, Department of Justice. 
Special Assistant to the General Counsel, 
Department of Education. 
Chief Counsel, Senate Judiciary 
Committee. 
General Counsel, U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights. 
Nancy Dorn  General Electric 
Company 
General Electric 
Company 
Chief of Staff, Rep. Tom Loeffler (R-Texas). 
Assistant to Vice President for Legislative 
Affairs, White House Office of Management 
and Budget. 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legislative 
Affairs, Department of State. 
Staff Associate, House Appropriations 
Committee. 
Legislative Aide, Vice President Dick 
Cheney. 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs, Department of Defense. 
Adviser, Rep. Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) 
Assistant Secretary for Civil Works, U.S. 
Army. 
Special Assistant for house Legislative 
Affairs, President George H. W. Bush. 
Kenneth M. 
Duberstein  
Duberstein 
Group 
General Motors Deputy Undersecretary, Department of 
Labor. 
Assistant and Deputy Assistant to the 
President for Legislative Affairs, President 
Ronald Reagan. 
Deputy Chief and Chief of Staff, President 
George H. W. Bush. 
Lauch Faircloth  Akin, Gump, 
Strauss, Hauer 
& Feld 
Dow Chemical 
Company 
U.S. Senator (R - N.C.), 1993-1999 
William Fant  Capitol Tax 
Partners 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Deputy Assistant for Legislative Affairs, 
Department of the Treasury. 
Brian Fitzgerald Swidler Berlin 
Shereff 
Friedman 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Staff, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 
the Constitution. 
Jayne 
Fitzgerald  
Clark 
Consulting 
Federal Policy 
Group 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Tax Counsel, House Ways and Means 
Committee. 
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Gary Gallant Swidler Berlin 
Shereff 
Friedman 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Senior Counsel, Joint Congressional 
Economic Committee. 
Karl Gallant  Alexander 
Strategy Group 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Executive Director of ARMPAC, Rep. Tom 
DeLay (R-Texas). 
Henry M. 
Gandy  
Duberstein 
Group 
Pfizer, General 
Motors 
White House Liaison Officer, President 
Ronald Reagan. 
Aide, Rep. Tom Loeffler (R-Texas). 
Aide, Rep. Trent Lott (R-Miss.). 
Steve Glaze  Palmetto Group Pfizer Tax Counselor, Sen. David Pryor (D-Ark.). 
Daniel Robert 
Glickman  
Akin, Gump, 
Strauss, Hauer 
& Feld 
Dow Chemical 
Company 
U.S. Representative (D-Kan.), 1977-1994. 
Secretary, Department of Agriculture. 
Attorney, Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
Richard 
Grafmeyer  
Capitol Tax 
Partners 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Joint Congressional 
Committee on Taxation. 
Karen 
Goldmeier 
Green  
Akin, Gump, 
Strauss, Hauer 
& Feld 
Dow Chemical 
Company, 
Honeywell 
International Inc. 
Health Counsel, Rep. Robert Matsui (D-
Calif.). 
Counsel, White House Conference on 
Aging. 
Janet Mullins 
Grissom  
Ford Motor 
Company 
Ford Motor 
Company 
Chief of Staff, Sen. Bob Packwood (R-
Ore.). 
Assistant for Political Affairs, President 
George H. W. Bush. 
Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, 
Department of State. 
Senate Campaign Manager, Sen. Mitch 
McConnell (R-Ky.). 
John Haddow  Parry, Romani, 
DeConcini & 
Symms 
Owens-Corning, 
Pfizer 
Aide, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah). 
Terry Haines  Alexander 
Strategy Group 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Staff Director, House Financial Services 
Committee. 
Chief of Staff, Federal Communications 
Commission. 
Counsel, House Energy and Commerce 
Committee. 
Staff Director, Rep. Michael Oxley (R-Ohio). 
Tim Hanford  Clark 
Consulting 
Federal Policy 
Group 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Tax Counsel, House Ways and Means 
Committee. 
Jim Hayes  Alexander 
Strategy Group 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Chief of Staff, Rep. Philip Crane (R-Ill.). 
James 
Heinbach  
Ricchetti Inc. Pfizer Legislative Affairs Director, Federal 
Communications Commission. 
Lindsay Hooper  Capitol Tax 
Partners 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Tax Counsel and Legislative Director, Sen. 
Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) 
Jack Howard  Wexler & 
Walker Public 
Policy 
Associates 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Aide, Rep. Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.). 
Deputy Assistant to the President and the 
Deputy Director of Legislative Affairs, 
President George W. Bush. 
Aide, Sen. Trent Lott (R-Miss). 
Aide, Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.). 
Joel Jankowsky  Akin, Gump, 
Strauss, Hauer 
& Feld 
Dow Chemical 
Company 
Legislative Assistant, Rep. Carl Albert (D-
Okla.). 
Ed Jenkins  Palmetto Group Pfizer U.S. Representative (D-Ga.), 1977-1992.  
Steve Jenning  Capitol Health 
Group 
Pfizer Staff Director, House Small Business 
Committee. 
Chief of Staff/Policy Director (1986-1987), 
Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) 
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Michael S. 
Johnson  
OB-C Group Honeywell 
International Inc. 
Chief of Staff and Press Secretary for the 
House Minority Leader, Rep. Robert Michel 
(R-Ill.). 
Alison Jones  Ford Motor 
Company 
Ford Motor 
Company 
Deputy Administrative Assistant, Sen. Paul 
Coverdell (R-Ga.). 
Staff, White House Office of Legislative 
Affairs. 
Thomas 
Keating  
OB-C Group Honeywell 
International Inc. 
Professional Staff Member, Office of the 
House Sergeant At Arms. 
Director of Policy Services and House 
Sergeant, Department of Defense Arms 
Control Bureau. 
Timothy 
Keating  
Honeywell 
International 
Inc. 
Honeywell 
International Inc. 
Special Assistant and Staff Director for 
Legislative Affairs, President Bill Clinton. 
Assistant Floor Manager, House 
Democratic Leadership. 
Kenneth J. Kies  Clark 
Consulting 
Federal Policy 
Group 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Chief of Staff, Joint Congressional 
Committee on Taxation. 
Chief Minority Tax Counsel, House Ways 
and Means Committee. 
Lisa 
Kountoupes  
Ricchetti Inc. Pfizer Deputy Assistant for Legislative Affairs, 
President Bill Clinton. 
Jeff Kuhnreich  Honeywell 
International 
Inc. 
Honeywell 
International Inc. 
Defense and Foreign Affairs Advisor, Sen. 
Christopher “Kit” Bond (R-Mo.). 
Legislative Assistant for Domestic Military 
Issues, Sen. John Kyl (R-Ariz.).  
Robert Leebern 
Jr. 
Troutman 
Sanders L.L.P. 
General Electric 
Company 
Chief of Staff, Rep. Saxby Chambliss (R-
Ga.). 
Norman Lent III  Lent Scrivner & 
Roth 
Pfizer Legislative Assistant, Sen. Connie Mack (R-
Fla.). 
Norman Lent  Lent Scrivner & 
Roth 
Pfizer U.S. Representative (R-N.Y.), 1971-1992 
Dan Leonard  Clark 
Consulting 
Federal Policy 
Group 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Chief of staff, Rep. Susan Molinari (R-N.Y.). 
Rob Leonard  Clark 
Consulting 
Federal Policy 
Group 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Chief Tax 
Counsel and Tax Counsel, House Ways 
and Means Committee. 
Ken Levine  Levine & 
Company 
GAF Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legislation, 
Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare. 
Director, Office of Congressional, 
Consumer and Public Affairs, Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission. 
Robert H. 
Marsh  
OB-C Group Honeywell 
International Inc. 
Aide Secretary Andrew Card, Department 
of Transportation. 
Aide, Rep. Peter Blute (R-Mass.). 
Aide, Office of Congressional Affairs, 
President George W. Bush. 
Thurgood 
Marshall Jr. 
Swidler Berlin 
Shereff 
Friedman 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Assistant to the President and Cabinet 
secretary, President Bill Clinton. 
Director of Legislative Affairs, Vice 
President Al Gore. 
Counsel, Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, Transportation. 
Counsel, Senate Government Affairs 
Committee. 
Counsel, Senate Judiciary Committee. 
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Kevin 
McGuiness  
McGuiness & 
Holch 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Republican Staff Director, Senate 
Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources. 
Chief of Staff, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah). 
William 
McKenney  
Capitol Tax 
Partners 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Chief of Staff , House Ways and Means 
Oversight Subcommittee. 
Chief of Staff, Rep. Amo Houghton (R-
N.Y.). 
Charles J. 
Mellody  
OB-C Group Honeywell 
International Inc. 
Aide, House Ways and Means Committee. 
Neil Messick  General Electric 
Company 
General Electric 
Company 
Aide, Sen. William Roth Jr. (R-Del.). 
Daniel Meyer  Duberstein 
Group 
General Motors, 
Pfizer 
Legislative Director (1982-1986), Legislative 
Assistant (1980-1982), and Projects 
Director (1979), Sen. Rudy Boschwitz (R-
Minn.). 
Administrative Assistant, Rep. Vin Weber 
(R-Minn.). 
Chief of Staff, Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) 
Joseph "Joe" 
Mikrut  
Capitol Tax 
Partners 
Asbestos Study 
Group 
Tax Counsel, Department of the Treasury. 
Patricia A. 
Nelson  
OB-C Group Honeywell 
International Inc. 
Staff Member, House Ways and Means 
Committee. 
Lawrence 
O'Brien III  
OB-C Group Honeywell 
International Inc. 
Deputy for Tax Legislation to the Assistant 
Secretary for Legislative Affairs, 
Department of the Treasury.  
Ziad Ojakli  Ford Motor 
Company 
Ford Motor 
Company 
Top Deputy for Legislative Affairs and 
Senate Liaison, President George W. Bush. 
Bill Paxon  Akin, Gump, 
Strauss, Hauer 
& Feld 
Dow Chemical 
Company 
U.S. Representative (R-N.Y.), 1989-1998 
Layna Peltier  Capitol Health 
Group 
Pfizer Legislative Assistant, Rep. Jim Lightfoot (R-
Iowa). 
Anthony 
Podesta  
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